How a ballot-receipt should *not* look

This is a creative but tremendously bad example of a ballot recipt:

Wired Magazine’s back-page each month features a photoshopped image that is meant to represent a telling found object from our future. They’re often good, but this month’s — a receipt from a paper-trail-leaving voting machine — is the best so far. Wow.

Link (BoingBoing)

If you look at the picture, you’ll see the ballot shows tracking numbers where you can log onto a website to verify your ballot.

The October 2004 issue of IEEE Spectrum has a good article that explains why this cannot be done:

Voting systems must never link an individual to his or her vote, or else it would be possible for the voter to sell a vote or a politico to coerce one. In short, voting machines need to produce transactions that are auditable. Officials need to be able to recount ballots, trace problems, and eliminate errors. All the while, they must never be able to identify who created which ballot. This problem has engaged some of the brightest minds in computer science and mathematics for a few years now, with no agreement yet about how it can best be solved.

But kudos for a creative example of “what could be” (if not “what should be”).

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